We study the selection of people when unequal payoffs are inevitable, but fair procedures are feasible, as in selecting one person from several candidates for a job. We show that allocators may be influenced by their similarity with a recipient, leading to favoritism in outcomes. We study four interventions to reduce favoritism and induce fair procedures, without restricting the allocator’s decisions: transparency of the allocation process; a private randomization device; allowing the allocator to delegate to a public randomization device; and allowing the allocator to avoid information about recipients. Making use of beliefs and fairness judgments, we show why some interventions work, while others do not (JEL D63, J16, J7, C92).

中文翻译：

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实施（不）公平的程序：当不平等的结果不可避免时，遏制偏袒

当不平等的报酬不可避免时，我们研究人员的选择，但公平的程序是可行的，例如从几个候选人中选择一个人担任一份工作。我们表明，分配者可能会受到与接受者相似性的影响，从而导致结果偏袒。我们研究了四种干预措施，以减少偏袒和诱导公平程序，而不限制分配者的决定：分配过程的透明度；私人随机设备；允许分配器委托给公共随机设备；并允许分配者避免有关接收者的信息。利用信念和公平判断，我们展示了为什么一些干预措施有效，而另一些则无效（JEL D63、J16、J7、C92）。