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FISCAL EQUIVALENCE: PRINCIPLE AND PREDATION IN THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Social Philosophy and Policy ( IF 0.264 ) Pub Date : 2021-10-11 , DOI: 10.1017/s0265052521000303
Emily C. Skarbek 1
Affiliation  

Fiscal equivalence in the public administration of justice requires local police and courts to be financed exclusively by the populations that benefit from their services. Within a polycentric framework, broad based taxation to achieve fiscal equivalence is a desirable principle of public finance because it conceptually allows for the provision of justice to be determined by constituent’s preferences, and increases the political accountability of service providers to constituents. However, the overproduction of justice services can readily occur when the benefits of the justice system are not enjoyed equally. Paradoxically, the same properties that make fiscal equivalence desirable by imposing restraint and control between constituents and local government also create internal pressures for agents of the state to engage in predatory, revenue-generating behavior.

中文翻译:

财政对等:司法公共行政中的原则与掠夺

公共司法行政中的财政对等要求地方警察和法院完全由受益于其服务的人口提供资金。在多中心框架内,实现财政对等的基础广泛的税收是公共财政的可取原则,因为它在概念上允许由选民的偏好决定提供正义,并增加服务提供者对选民的政治责任。然而,当司法系统的利益得不到平等享有时,司法服务的生产过剩很容易发生。矛盾的是,通过在选民和地方政府之间施加约束和控制而使财政对等成为可取的相同属性也为国家代理人制造了内部压力,使其参与掠夺性,
更新日期:2021-10-11
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