Contemporary critics of the administrative state are right to highlight the dangers of vesting too much power in a centralized bureaucracy removed from popular oversight and accountability. Too often neglected in this literature, however, are the dangers of vesting too little power in a centralized state, which enables dominant groups to further expand their social and economic advantages through decentralized means. This article seeks to synthesize these concerns, understanding them as reflecting the same underlying danger of state capture. It then articulates a set of heuristics for the design of public and administrative institutions, which aim at minimizing the risks of capture from both public and private sources. By following these heuristics, it claims, we can successfully employ the administrative state as a weapon against concentrated private power, rather than allowing it to serve as a tool of dominant groups.

中文翻译：

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以权力对抗权力：行政国家作为对抗集中私人权力的武器

当代对行政国家的批评者正确地强调了将过多权力赋予一个远离大众监督和问责制的中央官僚机构的危险。然而，在这些文献中经常被忽视的是在中央集权国家中赋予太少权力的危险，这使得主导群体能够通过分散的手段进一步扩大其社会和经济优势。本文试图综合这些担忧，将它们理解为反映了同样潜在的状态捕获危险。然后，它为公共和行政机构的设计阐明了一套启发式方法，旨在最大限度地减少从公共和私人来源捕获的风险。通过遵循这些启发式方法，它声称，