The United States Constitution is, in form and fact, a kind of fiduciary instrument, and government officials acting pursuant to that document are subject to the background rules of fiduciary obligation that underlie all such documents. One of the most basic eighteenth-century fiduciary rules was the presumptive rule against subdelegation of discretionary authority. The rule was presumptive only; there were recognized exceptions that permitted subdelegation when it was specifically authorized by the instrument of agency, when it was validated by custom or tradition, and when it was necessary for accomplishment of the agent’s authorized purposes. To what extent might that third exception justify broad subdelegation of legislative authority by Congress to administrative agencies? Part of the answer, which is beyond the aims of this essay, depends on ascertaining the nature of the job entrusted to Congress under the Constitution, which means ascertaining the scope of Congress’s delegated powers. Another part of the answer depends on the extent to which expertise can and may serve as justification for entrusting others with tasks with which one has previously been entrusted. What would a responsible fiduciary approach to expertise—whether for purposes of advice or subdelegation—look like in the modern administrative state? The answer requires a careful examination of the idea of expertise and how it can be applied, and misapplied, in modern governance. This essay offers only the briefest introduction to that problem by trying to frame the questions that responsible fiduciaries need to ask before subdelegating authority. Such questions include: (1) What are the limits of the principal’s own knowledge? (2) What reason is there to think that gaps in that knowledge can, even in principle, be filled by experts? (3) Will application of expert knowledge lead in any particular instance lead to better decisions, given the ubiquitous problem of second-best? and (4) Have you picked the right experts, and will they actually apply expertise rather than using their claim to expertise as a cover for pursuing other goals? These questions in the context of the modern administrative state are just one aspect of a broader problem of nonexperts trying to evaluate—both before and after the fact—the work product of experts.

中文翻译：

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受托社会契约

美国宪法在形式和事实上都是一种信托文书，根据该文件行事的政府官员受所有此类文件所依据的信托义务的背景规则的约束。18 世纪最基本的信托规则之一是禁止转授自由裁量权的推定规则。该规则只是推定的；有一些公认的例外情况允许转授权，如果它得到代理文书的特别授权，当它被习俗或传统验证，以及当它是完成代理人的授权目的所必需的时候。第三个例外可以在多大程度上证明国会将立法权力广泛转授给行政机构？部分答案超出了本文的目的，取决于确定宪法赋予国会的工作的性质，这意味着确定国会授权的范围。答案的另一部分取决于专业知识在多大程度上可以并且可以作为将以前委托给他人的任务委托给他人的理由。在现代行政国家中，对专业知识的负责任的信托方法——无论是出于建议还是转委的目的——会是什么样子？答案需要仔细检查专业知识的概念，以及它如何在现代治理中应用和误用。本文仅通过尝试构建负责任的受托人在转授权力之前需要提出的问题来对该问题进行最简要的介绍。此类问题包括：(1) 校长自己的知识有哪些限制？(2) 有什么理由认为，即使在原则上，专家也可以填补该知识的空白？(3) 考虑到普遍存在的次优问题，专家知识的应用会在任何特定情况下导致更好的决策吗？(4) 你是否选择了合适的专家，他们是否会真正运用专业知识，而不是利用他们的专业知识作为追求其他目标的掩护？现代行政国家背景下的这些问题只是非专家试图评估——无论是事前还是事后——专家的工作成果的更广泛问题的一个方面。由专家填写？(3) 考虑到普遍存在的次优问题，专家知识的应用会在任何特定情况下导致更好的决策吗？(4) 你是否选择了合适的专家，他们是否会真正运用专业知识，而不是利用他们的专业知识作为追求其他目标的掩护？现代行政国家背景下的这些问题只是非专家试图评估——无论是事前还是事后——专家的工作成果的更广泛问题的一个方面。由专家填写？(3) 考虑到普遍存在的次优问题，专家知识的应用会在任何特定情况下导致更好的决策吗？(4) 你是否选择了合适的专家，他们是否会真正运用专业知识，而不是利用他们的专业知识作为追求其他目标的掩护？现代行政国家背景下的这些问题只是非专家试图评估——无论是事前还是事后——专家的工作成果的更广泛问题的一个方面。他们真的会运用专业知识，而不是利用他们对专业知识的要求来追求其他目标吗？现代行政国家背景下的这些问题只是非专家试图评估——无论是事前还是事后——专家的工作成果的更广泛问题的一个方面。他们真的会运用专业知识，而不是利用他们对专业知识的要求来追求其他目标吗？现代行政国家背景下的这些问题只是非专家试图评估——无论是事前还是事后——专家的工作成果的更广泛问题的一个方面。