Following the Roosevelt administration’s implementation of New Deal programs in the 1930s, the federal courts began to interpret the Constitution in a way that accommodated the rise of the “administrative state,” and bureaucratic policymaking continues to persist as a central feature of American government today. This essay submits, however, that the three pillars supporting the administrative state—the congressional delegation of Article I powers to the executive branch, the combination of powers within individual administrative entities, and the insulation of administrators from political control—might be reconsidered by the courts in the near future. After showing that the constitutionality of the administrative state has come under recent judicial scrutiny, the essay turns to the administrative law principle of deference, and argues that a reassessment of the Chevron doctrine seems imminent. Finally, the essay examines federal courts’ heavy use of “hard look” review as a means of curtailing agency discretion during recent administrations, and concludes that this judicial practice stands in uneasy tension with republican principles.

中文翻译：

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行政国家的宪法和法律挑战

继罗斯福政府在 1930 年代实施新政计划后，联邦法院开始以适应“行政国家”兴起的方式解释宪法，而官僚决策继续作为当今美国政府的核心特征继续存在。然而，本文提出，支持行政国家的三大支柱——国会将第一条权力授予行政部门、单个行政实体内的权力组合以及行政人员不受政治控制——可能会被美国政府重新考虑。在不久的将来法院。在表明行政国家的合宪性受到最近的司法审查后，本文转向行政法的服从原则，并认为对雪佛龙学说的重新评估似乎迫在眉睫。最后，本文考察了联邦法院在最近几届政府中大量使用“严格审查”审查作为限制机构自由裁量权的一种手段，并得出结论认为，这种司法实践与共和党原则存在不安的紧张关系。