Purpose

This paper aims to investigate the influence of over-allocation and under-allocation of family board seats on the corporate investment efficiency.

Design/methodology/approach

Based on the perspective of altruistic behavior, this paper theoretically analyzes the relationship between the preference of family board seats allocation and corporate investment efficiency, and designs the research. On this basis, we use STATA14.0 as an analysis tool to empirically test the relationship between the preference of family family board seats allocation and corporate investment efficiency, and consider the impact of different governance scenarios.

Findings

This study finds that firms with a higher over-allocation degree of family board seats invest more efficiently, evidenced by significantly suppressed over-investment rather than mitigated under-investment. However, we do not find evidence that the higher degree of under-allocation of family board seats contribute to lower corporate investment efficiency. Additionally, this study finds that the positive relationship between the over-allocation degree of family board seats and corporate investment efficiency is more pronounced for firms with higher separation of cash flow rights and control rights, and weaker regional law system environment. Our mechanism discussion shows that the higher over-allocation level of family board seats contributes to the mitigation of agency costs for family firms by reducing the tendency for non-family boards to vote “against board proposals” and the appropriation behavior of the controlling family, and eventually improving corporate investment efficiency.

Originality/value

This paper examines the relationship between the preference of family board seats allocation and corporate investment efficiency from the perspective of altruistic behavior. Unlike previous studies, this paper distinguishes the governance effects arising from over-allocation and under-allocation of family board seats. Additionally, different governance scenarios are incorporated into the decision-making mechanism of the board of family firms, and the influences of the divergence of cash-flow and control rights and a weaker regional law system on the governance effect of the preference of family board seat allocation are analyzed.

中文翻译：

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家族董事会席位分配偏好是否影响企业投资效率？

目的

本文旨在研究家族董事会席位过度分配和分配不足对企业投资效率的影响。

设计/方法/方法

本文基于利他行为的视角，从理论上分析了家族董事会席位分配偏好与企业投资效率之间的关系，并设计了研究。在此基础上，我们以STATA14.0为分析工具，实证检验家族家族董事会席位分配偏好与企业投资效率的关系，并考虑不同治理情景的影响。

发现

本研究发现，家族董事会席位过度分配程度较高的公司投资效率更高，这可以通过显着抑制过度投资而不是缓解投资不足来证明。然而，我们没有发现证据表明，家族董事会席位分配不足的程度较高会导致企业投资效率降低。此外，本研究还发现，现金流权与控制权分离程度越高、区域法律制度环境越弱的企业，家族董事会席位的过度分配程度与企业投资效率之间的正相关关系越明显。

原创性/价值

本文从利他行为的角度考察了家族董事会席位分配偏好与企业投资效率的关系。与以往的研究不同，本文区分了家族董事会席位过度分配和分配不足所产生的治理效应。此外，不同的治理情景被纳入家族企业董事会的决策机制，现金流量和控制权的分歧和较弱的地区法律制度对家族董事会席位偏好的治理效果的影响分配进行分析。