Japan’s ‘nationalization’ of three islands of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2012 involves a Sino–Japanese territorial dispute as well as a strategic narrative contestation within Japan. This article argues that ‘strategic narrative’, a persuasive discursive tool, can exert power through three communicative processes (formation, projection, and reception) in the same way as Copenhagen School’s ‘securitization’ concept. Thus, the strategic narrative can be used to explain the mechanism of securitization. In the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku nationalization crisis, the then Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro formed and projected a ‘provocation narrative’ to securitize the territorial issue, and then Japanese Prime minister Noda Yoshihiko attempted to use a ‘peace and stabilization narrative’ to calm things down. After analyzing the narrative contestation processes between Ishihara and Noda, this article finds that it was Ishihara’s triumph on the battlefield of strategic narrative, despite the result of the ultimate success of Noda to ‘nationalize’ the disputed islands.

中文翻译：

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国内领土争端：日本钓鱼岛/尖阁诸岛国有化政策的战略叙事之争

2012年日本对钓鱼岛/尖阁诸岛三岛的“国有化”涉及中日领土争端以及日本国内的战略叙事之争。本文认为，“战略叙事”作为一种有说服力的话语工具，可以像哥本哈根学派的“证券化”概念一样，通过三个交际过程（形成、投射和接受）发挥力量。因此，战略叙事可以用来解释证券化的机制。2012年钓鱼岛/尖阁国家化危机中，时任东京都知事石原慎太郎形成并提出“挑衅叙事”将领土问题安全化，时任日本首相野田佳彦试图用“和平稳定叙事”平息事态.