Firms sometimes have problems with their products or management systems: problems that can lead to catastrophic events. However, while workers in these firms are often aware of these problems, they sometimes fail to report them to their superiors. This paper examines workers’ incentives for concealing problems within an overlapping generations organization consisting of a subordinate and a manager. The results reveal that concealment exhibits strategic complementarity across different generations, which can lead to multiple equilibria. Further, imposing punishment and rewards on managers may paradoxically increase the motivation for concealment (JEL D23, D82, M51).

中文翻译：

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隐藏作为重叠代组织中的责任转移*

公司有时会在其产品或管理系统方面遇到问题：这些问题可能导致灾难性事件。然而，虽然这些公司的工人经常意识到这些问题，但他们有时没有向上级报告这些问题。本文研究了工人在由下属和经理组成的重叠世代组织中隐瞒问题的动机。结果表明，隐藏在不同世代之间表现出战略互补性，这可能导致多重均衡。此外，对管理者施加惩罚和奖励可能会自相矛盾地增加隐瞒的动机（JEL D23、D82、M51）。