How to allocate personnel is a central question in the organization of the state. We link survey data on the performance of 1471 elite civil servants in India to their personnel records between 1975 and 2005 to study how home allocations affect their performance and careers. Using exogenous variation in home assignment generated by an allocation rule, we find that bureaucrats assigned to their home states are perceived to be less effective and more likely to be suspended. These negative effects are driven by states with higher levels of corruption and cohorts with greater numbers of home state officers. (JEL: J45, O43, D73, M5)

中文翻译：

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国家组织：家庭分配和官僚表现

如何分配人员是国家组织的核心问题。我们将印度 1471 名精英公务员绩效的调查数据与 1975 年至 2005 年间的人事记录联系起来，以研究住房分配如何影响他们的绩效和职业。使用分配规则产生的家庭分配的外生变化，我们发现分配到其家乡的官僚被认为效率较低且更有可能被停职。这些负面影响是由腐败程度较高的州和本国官员人数较多的州推动的。（JEL：J45、O43、D73、M5）