Abstract

We investigate how supplier performance is influenced by the behaviors (self-interested behaviors and gatekeeping actions) of a supplier’s salesperson and engineer, and how such behaviors affect a performance-based contract design to ensure the desired performance from the supplier. This article develops a incentive contract that proves how such behaviors affect supplier performance, elucidating how agents’ behaviors influence a buyer’s incentive contract form for collaboration with the supplier. Our study found that in general, the behaviors of salespeople and engineers can damage supplier performance. Their impact changes depending on some contingent factors, proposing incentive contract forms that can mitigate the negative consequences of the behaviors on supplier and buyer performance. This paper takes multiple agents’ behaviors and their behavioral disutility into consideration when developing an incentive contract.

摘要

我们调查供应商的销售人员和工程师的行为（自利行为和守门行为）如何影响供应商的绩效，以及这些行为如何影响基于绩效的合同设计，以确保供应商的预期绩效。本文开发了一个激励合同，证明此类行为如何影响供应商绩效，阐明代理人的行为如何影响买方与供应商合作的激励合同形式。我们的研究发现，一般来说，销售人员和工程师的行为会损害供应商的绩效。它们的影响取决于一些或有因素而变化，提出了可以减轻这些行为对供应商和买方绩效的负面影响的激励合同形式。