This essay seeks to contribute to the literature that asks how interim constitutions can become self-enforcing norms capable of producing a successful constitution-making process. It uses the Chilean constitution-making process as an example to theorize on how the political narratives associated with the November 2019 Agreement, which sets the framework for constitutional change, can influence its self-enforcing capacity. The authors identify and reconstruct the two prevailing normative theories underlying the Chilean constitution-making process: the evolutive and the revolutionary narratives. These present themselves in both radical and moderate versions. While evolutive ideas emphasize institutional continuity, consensus-building, and an incrementalist approach to constitutional change, revolutionary arguments rely on the constituent power theory and push for a profound social transformation that can break with the past. Even though these narratives are in tension with each other in many respects, they have both influenced the design of the rules of the constitution-making process. The authors claim that the self-enforcing capacity of the interim constitution partly depends on whether, and to what extent, the moderate versions of these narratives succeed or prevail in the political discourse.

本文旨在为关于临时宪法如何成为能够产生成功的宪法制定过程的自我执行规范的文献做出贡献。它以智利宪法制定过程为例，对与 2019 年 11 月协议相关的政治叙事如何影响其自我执行能力进行理论分析，该协议设定了宪法变革的框架。作者确定并重构了智利宪法制定过程背后的两种流行规范理论：进化叙事和革命叙事。这些都以激进和温和的版本出现。虽然进化的想法强调制度的连续性、建立共识和渐进式的宪法变革方法，革命性的论点依赖于制宪权理论，并推动可以打破过去的深刻社会变革。尽管这些叙述在许多方面相互矛盾，但它们都影响了制宪过程规则的设计。作者声称，临时宪法的自我执行能力部分取决于这些叙述的温和版本是否以及在多大程度上在政治话语中取得成功或盛行。