Purpose

Climate finance is regularly not only seen as a tool to efficiently combat global warming but also to solve development problems in the recipient countries and to support the attainment of sustainable development goals. Thereby, conflicts between distributive and allocative objectives arise, which threaten the overall performance of such transfer schemes. Given the severity of the climate change problem, this study aims to raise concerns about whether the world can afford climate transfer schemes that do not focus on prevention of (and adaptation to) climate change but might be considered as a vehicle of rent-seeking by many agents.

Design/methodology/approach

Future designs of international transfer schemes within the framework of the Paris Agreement are to be based on experience gained from existing mechanisms. Therefore, the authors examine different existing schemes using a graphical technique first proposed by David Pearce and describe the conflicts between allocative and distributional goals that arise.

Findings

In line with the famous Tinbergen rule, the authors argue that other sustainability problems and issues of global fairness should not be primarily addressed by climate finance but should be mainly tackled by other means.

Research limitations/implications

As there is still ongoing, intense discussion about how the international transfer schemes addressed in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement should be designed, the research will help to sort some of the key arguments.

Practical implications

There are prominent international documents (like the Paris Agreement and the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development) seeking to address different goals simultaneously. While synergies between policies is desirable, there are major challenges for policy coordination. Addressing several different goals using fewer policy instruments, for example, will not succeed as the Tinbergen Rule points out.

Social implications

The integration of co-benefits in the analysis allows for taking into account the social effects of climate policy. As the authors argue, climate finance approaches could become overstrained if policymakers would consider them as tools to also solve local sustainability problems.

Originality/value

In this paper, the authors will not only examine what can be learnt from the clean development mechanism (CDM) for future schemes under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement but also observe the experiences gained from a non-CDM scheme. So the authors pay attention to the Trust Fund of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) which was established with global benefit orientation, i.e. – unlike the CDM – it was not regarded as an additional goal to support local sustainable development. Yet, despite its disregard of local co-benefits, the authors think that it is of particular importance to include the GEF in the analysis, as some important lessons can be learnt from it.

中文翻译：

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国际气候融资过度紧张：当目标冲突威胁到其成功时

目的

气候融资不仅经常被视为有效应对全球变暖的工具，而且还被视为解决受援国发展问题和支持实现可持续发展目标的工具。因此，分配目标和分配目标之间出现冲突，威胁到此类转移计划的整体绩效。鉴于气候变化问题的严重性，本研究旨在引起人们的担忧，即世界是否能够负担得起不侧重于预防（和适应）气候变化但可能被视为寻租工具的气候转移计划。许多代理。

设计/方法/方法

《巴黎协定》框架内国际转移计划的未来设计将基于从现有机制中获得的经验。因此，作者使用 David Pearce 首次提出的图形技术检查了不同的现有方案，并描述了分配目标和分配目标之间出现的冲突。

发现

根据著名的廷伯根规则，作者认为其他可持续性问题和全球公平问题不应主要通过气候融资来解决，而应主要通过其他方式来解决。

研究限制/影响

由于关于如何设计《巴黎协定》第 6 条所涉及的国际转移计划的讨论仍在进行中，因此该研究将有助于对一些关键论点进行分类。

实际影响

有一些著名的国际文件（如《巴黎协定》和《联合国 2030 年可持续发展议程》）寻求同时解决不同的目标。虽然政策之间的协同作用是可取的，但政策协调存在重大挑战。例如，使用较少的政策工具来实现几个不同的目标将不会像丁伯根规则所指出的那样成功。

社会影响

在分析中整合共同利益可以考虑气候政策的社会影响。正如作者认为的那样，如果政策制定者将气候融资方法视为解决当地可持续性问题的工具，气候融资方法可能会变得过度紧张。

原创性/价值

在本文中，作者不仅将研究可以从《巴黎协定》第 6 条下未来计划的清洁发展机制 (CDM) 中学到什么，还将观察从非 CDM 计划中获得的经验。因此，作者关注了以全球利益为导向设立的全球环境基金（GEF）信托基金，即与 CDM 不同的是，它不被视为支持当地可持续发展的额外目标。然而，尽管无视当地的共同利益，作者认为将 GEF 纳入分析尤为重要，因为可以从中学到一些重要的经验教训。