Researchers have shown that structuring issues and organizing an agenda before a negotiation lead to improved negotiation performance. By using issue analysis, negotiators become aware of their own and their opponents’ preferences on negotiation issues and are able to use this knowledge to optimize their degree of success. Following research on asymmetrical preferences in negotiations, we introduce a new approach for issue analysis that considers the identification of one-sided preferences, specifically a 0-preference for issues from one party. We conducted an experimental study to test if this type of preference for an issue (chance issue) yields strategic potential for a negotiator. We also examined whether the identification of these chance issues could be particularly relevant for a low-power party in negotiations with a power imbalance, to overcome the lower scope of action due to the weaker negotiating position. The results indicate initial verification that no preference at all for one issue could lead to higher individual performance and noneconomic outcomes. Joint performance was positively affected by 0-preference, even in unbalanced power situations.

中文翻译：

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议题分析的新视角——单边偏好作为多议题谈判的战略来源

研究人员已经表明，在谈判之前构建问题和组织议程可以提高谈判绩效。通过使用问题分析，谈判者可以了解自己和对手在谈判问题上的偏好，并能够利用这些知识来优化他们的成功程度。在对谈判中的不对称偏好进行研究之后，我们引入了一种新的问题分析方法，该方法考虑了单方面偏好的识别，特别是对一方问题的 0 偏好。我们进行了一项实验研究，以测试这种对问题（机会问题）的偏好是否会为谈判者带来战略潜力。我们还研究了在权力不平衡的谈判中，确定这些机会问题是否与低权力一方特别相关，克服由于谈判地位较弱而导致行动范围较小的问题。结果表明初步证实，对一个问题完全没有偏好可能会导致更高的个人绩效和非经济结果。联合绩效受到 0 偏好的积极影响，即使在不平衡的权力情况下也是如此。