In considering the value of the judicial takings doctrine, this Comment argues that we should look to a new area of law: procedure. Courts often have the authority to set procedure, and they use this authority for substantive ends. This Comment argues that applying the Takings Clause to procedure demonstrates the value of the judicial takings doctrine. It argues that the Takings Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause, is the appropriate framework for certain forms of procedure. Under the Takings Clause, we can recognize the judiciary’s authority to use procedure for substantive ends while also offering “just compensation” to those unduly affected. In contending with the practical effects of “judicial-procedure takings,” this Comment argues that we can supplement the existing takings framework in two ways. First, we can look to intent: where the government intends to single out a particular set of property owners to bear a public burden, that should weigh in favor of finding a taking. Second, we can refine our analysis by focusing on whether the act has an element of aggregation. Where the court has combined discrete elements to create a result that is greater than the sum of its parts, that too should weigh in favor of a taking. By supplementing the existing test, we can better identify procedures that are functionally equivalent to traditional takings— without swallowing up the courts in the process.

在考虑司法征收原则的价值时，本评论认为我们应该关注一个新的法律领域：程序。法院通常有权设定程序，并将这一权力用于实质性目的。该评论认为，将征收条款应用于程序展示了司法征收原则的价值。它认为，征用条款，而不是正当程序条款，是某些程序形式的适当框架。根据征收条款，我们可以承认司法机关有权将程序用于实质性目的，同时也向那些受到不当影响的人提供“公正的补偿”。针对“司法程序征收”的实际效果，本评论认为我们可以通过两种方式补充现有的征收框架。首先，我们可以看一下意图：如果政府打算挑出一组特定的财产所有者来承担公共负担，则应权衡利弊。其次，我们可以通过关注该行为是否具有聚合元素来完善我们的分析。如果法院结合了离散元素以产生大于其各部分总和的结果，那么这也应该权衡利弊。通过补充现有的测试，我们可以更好地识别在功能上等同于传统征收的程序——而不会在这个过程中吞并法庭。如果法院结合了离散元素以产生大于其各部分总和的结果，那么这也应该权衡利弊。通过补充现有的测试，我们可以更好地识别在功能上等同于传统征收的程序——而不会在这个过程中吞并法庭。如果法院结合了离散元素以产生大于其各部分总和的结果，那么这也应该权衡利弊。通过补充现有的测试，我们可以更好地识别在功能上等同于传统征收的程序——而不会在这个过程中吞并法庭。