This article explores how participation in microfinance programs affects informal credit conditions. Using data on the rural credit market of Andhra Pradesh, I provide evidence that group lending participants obtain lower interest rates from the informal credit market. This result can be explained by two main factors. On the one hand, due to joint liability, group lending clients have high incentives to monitor each other, which implies a reduction in the agency costs for moneylenders. On the other hand, as microfinance borrowers are required to invest the credit in income generating activities, they face a lower default risk. Taken together, these two mechanisms may explain why microcredit borrowers are perceived as less risky by informal lenders. Overall, the findings suggest that moneylenders benefit from the duality in the market, thus providing empirical support to recent theoretical research hypothesizing that there is a complementarity relationship between formal and informal credit suppliers.

本文探讨参与小额信贷计划如何影响非正式信贷条件。使用安得拉邦农村信贷市场的数据，我提供了团体贷款参与者从非正式信贷市场获得较低利率的证据。这一结果可以用两个主要因素来解释。一方面，由于连带责任，团贷客户之间相互监督的动机很高，这意味着放债人的代理成本降低。另一方面，由于小额信贷借款人需要将信贷投资于创收活动，因此他们面临的违约风险较低。综合起来，这两种机制可以解释为什么非正式贷方认为小额信贷借款人的风险较小。总体而言，调查结果表明放债人受益于市场的二元性，