The contemporary view of the relationship between conscious and unconscious intentionality consists in two claims: (i) unconscious propositional attitudes represent the world the same way conscious ones do, and (ii) both sets of attitudes represent by having determinate propositional content. Crane (2017) has challenged both claims, proposing instead that unconscious propositional attitudes differ from conscious ones in being less determinate in nature. This paper aims to evaluate Crane's proposal. In particular, I make explicit and critique certain assumptions Crane makes in support of his asymmetry, and argue for a conditional claim: if Crane is right that unconscious intentional states are (relatively) indeterminate, this suggests that conscious intentional states are indeterminate in a similar fashion as well.

当代关于有意识和无意识意向性之间关系的观点包括两个主张：（i）无意识的命题态度以与有意识的态度相同的方式代表世界，（ii）两组态度都通过具有确定的命题内容来代表。Crane (2017) 对这两种说法都提出了挑战，而是提出无意识的命题态度与有意识的态度不同，其本质上不太确定。本文旨在评估 Crane 的提议。特别是，我明确并批评了 Crane 为支持他的不对称性而做出的某些假设，并论证了一个有条件的主张：如果 Crane 是正确的，即无意识的意向状态是（相对）不确定的，这表明有意识的意向状态在类似的情况下是不确定的时尚也是如此。