In this article, we discuss how the too-big-to-fail dilemma for large financial institution is addressed in the regulatory framework and how (differently) regulators in the EU apply it. The European Banking Authority (EBA) has devised a buffer guideline for identifying other systemically important institutions (OSIIs) to address this issue. This guideline defines how to identify OSIIs by a scoring process but does not specify how to map these scores into additional capital buffers. In this study, we empirically show that the OSII buffer assignment is very heterogeneous in Europe. First, based on all EU banks that were classified as OSIIs, we show that the OSII score has less impact on the OSII buffer than the headquarter country dummy. Second, if all countries applied the German OSII buffer assignment, the additional capital requirements in the euro area would increase by 90 bn EUR. Third, we analyze whether our results could be explained by regulatory capture which is measured by supervisory quality, supervisory funding, importance/concentration of the banking system, and political orientation of the government. We find among others that supervisory quality and supervisory funding without banks' participation increase OSII buffers significantly.

中文翻译：

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其他系统重要性机构的资本缓冲校准——欧盟的国家异质性是由监管俘获造成的吗？

在本文中，我们将讨论如何在监管框架中解决大型金融机构的“太大而不能倒”的困境，以及欧盟监管机构如何（不同地）应用它。欧洲银行管理局 (EBA) 制定了一项缓冲指南，用于识别其他系统重要性机构 (OSII) 以解决此问题。该指南定义了如何通过评分过程来识别 OSII，但没有指定如何将这些评分映射到额外的资本缓冲中。在这项研究中，我们凭经验表明 OSII 缓冲区分配在欧洲非常不同。首先，基于所有被归类为 OSII 的欧盟银行，我们表明 OSII 分数对 OSII 缓冲的影响小于总部国家虚拟变量。其次，如果所有国家都应用德国 OSII 缓冲区分配，欧元区的额外资本要求将增加 900 亿欧元。第三，我们分析我们的结果是否可以用监管质量、监管资金、银行系统的重要性/集中度和政府的政治取向来衡量的监管捕获来解释。我们发现，在没有银行参与的情况下，监管质量和监管资金显着增加了 OSII 缓冲。