Romania ranks at the extreme low end in Eastern Europe in terms of Hofstede cultural insights, rule of law, government effectiveness, and corruption—potentially limiting governance quality for restricting resource channeling. In this paper, we examine whether these shortcomings flow over into the degree of corporate insider trading profitability at the firm level. Consistent with high power distance, low individualism, and voice and accountability, executives and their family members extract higher returns. The conjectured monitoring constraint of equity ownership had little impact on reducing profitable trading. Second, media reporting of firm-related scandals only restrained insider profitability in firms with government ownership—consistent with general forbearance of corruption and sanction from the use of politically controlled assets. Third, the global financial crisis revealed both a crisis of inept trading consistent with high uncertainty avoidance and also highly profitable trades for a limited set of executives who undertook short-term reversal strategies. Our exploratory microanalysis suggests a prototype to highlight areas requiring governance and investor attention in Eastern European countries.

中文翻译：

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罗马尼亚的治理：探索企业内幕交易的决定因素

罗马尼亚在霍夫斯泰德的文化洞察力、法治、政府效率和腐败方面处于东欧的极低端——这可能会限制治理质量以限制资源输送。在本文中，我们研究了这些缺点是否会影响公司层面的公司内幕交易盈利能力。与高权力距离、低个人主义、话语权和责任感相一致，高管及其家人可以获得更高的回报。推测的股权监控约束对减少盈利交易影响不大。其次，媒体对公司相关丑闻的报道只会限制政府所有的公司的内部盈利能力——这与普遍容忍腐败和对使用政治控制资产的制裁相一致。第三，全球金融危机既揭示了与高度不确定性规避相一致的无能交易危机，也揭示了采取短期逆转策略的有限高管的高利润交易。我们的探索性微观分析提出了一个原型，以突出东欧国家需要治理和投资者关注的领域。