We examine the role of regulatory independence on electricity generation performance in India. Electricity generation in India is exposed to several regulatory jurisdictions with varying levels of regulatory independence. Based on the level of regulatory independence, we classify Indian coal fired power plants into two groups, and evaluate their performance over the period 2005–14 using the non-radial directional distance function model in a meta-frontier framework. We find that plants under relatively less independent state regulators are more inefficient than plants under the largely independent central regulator. Differences in independence between state and central regulators account for nearly half of the inefficiency of plants under the state regulation. Regression analysis reveals that the channels of causation of regulatory independence on plant performance are through its effects on coal consumption and electricity generation. Our results suggest the need for two policy interventions: (1) providing greater independence to state regulators for bridging the performance gaps between plants subject to different regulators, and (2) a more forward-looking norm setting process through the use of benchmarking techniques by identifying best practices and performance among plants.

我们研究了监管独立性对印度发电绩效的作用。印度的发电受到多个监管独立性程度不同的监管管辖区的监管。根据监管独立程度，我们将印度燃煤电厂分为两组，并使用元前沿框架中的非径向方向距离函数模型评估它们在 2005-14 年期间的绩效。我们发现，在独立性相对较低的国家监管机构管辖下的工厂比在很大程度上独立的中央监管机构管辖下的工厂效率更低。国家监管机构和中央监管机构之间独立性的差异导致了国家监管下工厂效率低下的近一半。回归分析表明，监管独立性对电厂绩效的影响渠道是通过其对煤炭消耗和发电的影响。我们的结果表明需要采取两项政策干预措施：（1）为国家监管机构提供更大的独立性，以缩小受不同监管机构管辖的工厂之间的绩效差距，以及（2）通过使用基准测试技术来制定更具前瞻性的规范制定过程确定工厂之间的最佳实践和绩效。