Abstract

Using a screening model with asymmetric information, I evaluate the positive and normative effects of the subsidized default insurance policy in the U.S. mortgage market. The model implies that the subsidy raises interest rates for eligible mortgages, which is contrary to conventional wisdom but is consistent with the empirical evidence in Zhao (2019 Zhao, Y. (2019). Evidence of government subsidy on mortgage rate and default: Revisited. Journal of Housing Research, 28(1), 23–49. https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2019.12092157[Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]). Moreover, the model implies that the subsidy hurts borrowers it was intended to help, as well as raises the aggregate mortgage default rate. My article highlights the adverse impact of the subsidy on welfare and financial stability, and sheds light on the root cause of the global financial crisis. It also provides potentially useful reference to other countries that have (or are considering adopting) a mortgage subsidy mechanism similar to that in the US.

摘要

使用具有不对称信息的筛选模型，我评估了美国抵押贷款市场上的补贴违约保险政策的积极和规范效应。该模型暗示补贴提高了符合条件的抵押贷款的利率，这与传统观念相反，但与赵（ 2019）的经验证据一致 赵毅（2019）。政府对抵押贷款利率和违约的补贴的证据：重新审视。住房研究杂志，28 (1), 23 – 49。https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2019.12092157 [泰勒和弗朗西斯在线]  ，[谷歌学术]）。此外，该模型暗示补贴会伤害到原本打算帮助的借款人，并提高总抵押贷款违约率。我的文章强调了补贴对福利和金融稳定的不利影响，并阐明了根源全球金融危机的原因。它还为其他已经（或正在考虑采用）类似于美国的抵押贷款补贴机制的国家提供了潜在的有用参考。