Many philosophers and legal scholars believe that the principle of retribution can be employed as a basis for respecting the offender as a person and for imposing relatively soft sentences. This belief is inspired, at least to a certain extent, by the penal philosophy of Kant and Hegel. My aim in this article is to question this widely held belief, with my contention being that retributivists locate the basis of these normative considerations in the wrong place. It is not the application of the principle of retribution that makes systems of criminal law fair and restrained, but rather the other way around: Only by restricting the application of the principle of retribution in various ways can we arrive at a system of penal law that is reasonable and just. These restrictions themselves are not retributive in nature, but are intended to keep the principle of retribution in check. To substantiate these claims, I discuss the views of an older generation of philosophers and scientists, specifically those of Sidgwick, Durkheim, Malinowski, and Piaget, and hold that these provide a fruitful basis for a better understanding of the principle of retribution. In the second part of the article, I investigate how this alternative understanding relates to the principles of proportionality and mens rea, while also making some clarifying remarks about the issue of moral luck.

中文翻译：

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报应基本原理的持久针对性☆

许多哲学家和法律学者认为，报应原则可以作为尊重犯罪人为人并判处相对较轻的刑罚的依据。这种信念至少在一定程度上受到了康德和黑格尔的刑罚哲学的启发。我在本文中的目的是质疑这种广泛持有的信念，我的论点是报应主义者将这些规范性考虑的基础放在错误的地方。使刑法制度公平和克制的不是报应原则的适用，而是相反：只有通过各种方式限制报应原则的适用，才能形成一种刑法制度，是合理和公正的。这些限制本身并不是报应性的，但目的是为了控制报应原则。为了证实这些说法，我讨论了老一代哲学家和科学家的观点，特别是西奇威克、涂尔干、马林诺夫斯基和皮亚杰的观点，并认为这些观点为更好地理解报应原则提供了富有成果的基础。在文章的第二部分，我研究了这种替代性理解如何与比例原则和mens rea，同时也对道德运气问题发表了一些澄清性的评论。