This article explores the performance of strict liability and negligence when agents initially have imperfect information about what care options exist to influence expected accidental harm. A technology that establishes a basic level of care is commonly known in our framework, but whether a superior one exists is uncertain. Injurers and/or victims can engage in a costly search to find out. For this setup, we show that strict liability can induce lower social costs than negligence when the superior care technology’s existence is moderately likely and agents’ search costs are high, a combination likely to apply to new and complex activities. Instead, negligence is socially preferred when the superior care technology’s existence is either very likely or very unlikely, or when search costs are low, configurations likely to apply to well-established activities.

中文翻译：

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严格责任和疏忽与寻求预防措施

本文探讨了当代理人最初对存在哪些护理选项以影响预期意外伤害的信息不完整时，严格责任和疏忽的表现。建立基本护理水平的技术在我们的框架中是众所周知的，但是否存在更好的技术尚不确定。加害者和/或受害者可以进行昂贵的搜索以找出答案。对于这种设置，我们表明，当高级护理技术的存在可能性适中并且代理人的搜索成本很高时，严格责任可以比疏忽产生更低的社会成本，这种组合可能适用于新的和复杂的活动。相反，当高级护理技术很可能或不太可能存在，或者搜索成本很低时，疏忽是社会偏好的，