The Bank of Japan (BOJ) expanded its liquidity provision in response to a series of financial panics from 1931–1932; however, the BOJ restricted its lending mostly to correspondent banks. We use the BOJ’s preferential treatment of correspondent banks as a quasi-experimental setting to examine the impact of central bank lending on financial intermediation. We find that deposits and loans did not fall as fast for correspondent banks as for other banks during the panic period. Furthermore, correspondent banks were less likely to be closed. The results suggest that central banks’ liquidity provision plays a critical backstop role during financial stringency.

中文翻译：

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日本大萧条时期最后贷款人对金融中介的影响

日本银行 (BOJ) 扩大了流动性供应以应对 1931 年至 1932 年的一系列金融恐慌；然而，日本央行主要限制向代理银行放贷。我们使用日本央行对代理银行的优惠待遇作为准实验设置来检验央行贷款对金融中介的影响。我们发现，在恐慌期间，代理行的存贷款下降速度不如其他银行。此外，代理银行不太可能关闭。结果表明，中央银行的流动性供应在金融紧缩期间起着关键的支持作用。