We add to our understanding of the optimal method of judicial selection by exploiting an unusual feature in North Carolina: judges rotate location every 6 months. This allows us to identify the existence and source of sentencing variation over the electoral cycle. We show that when elections approach, felony sentences rise. This increase is found exclusively when judges are sentencing in their district of election, and only when elections are contested. When judges hear cases outside their home district, sentences do not significantly vary over the electoral cycle. Our results show that electoral sentencing cycles can be explained by strategic sentencing by judges in an attempt to please voters. The unique setting allows us to reject alternative behavioral or contextual explanations for the rise in sentences as elections approach. (JEL K42).

中文翻译：

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选举量刑周期

我们通过利用北卡罗来纳州的一个不寻常的特征来增加我们对最佳司法选择方法的理解：法官每 6 个月轮换一次地点。这使我们能够确定选举周期中量刑变化的存在和来源。我们展示了选举方法时，重罪判决上升。这种增加仅在法官在其选举区进行判决时才会出现，并且只有在选举存在争议时才会出现。当法官在其所在地区以外的地方审理案件时，判决在整个选举周期内没有显着变化。我们的研究结果表明，选举量刑周期可以解释为法官为了取悦选民而进行的战略性判决。随着选举的临近，独特的环境使我们能够拒绝对句子增加的替代行为或上下文解释。(JEL K42)。