The lively debate about the right of gig workers to bargain collectively stems from the idea that European Union (EU) competition law treats this group of workers worse than it treats employees. Namely, it is common to argue that employees, unlike gig workers, are permitted to conclude collective agreements because they are not undertakings and, therefore, not subject to EU competition law. In sharp contrast, by analysing the EU notion of undertaking, this article demonstrates—and this is the first of its theses—that in the labour market, which is the market that should matter in relation to the effects of collective agreements, employees are as much undertakings as any other worker, such as gig workers or other self-employed workers. The article further maintains that the reason employees are currently allowed to bargain collectively, while other workers are not, is to be found not within competition law, but outside it. At present, employees’ collective agreements are exempt from the application of EU competition law because employees enjoy the right to bargain collectively, among other social rights, and because the Court of Justice of the European Union has (rightly) recognized that the protection of these rights must trump the protection of competition. Consequently, this article argues, as its second thesis, that if Articles 151–161 TFEU were interpreted so as to grant social rights to workers other than employees, the collective agreements of gig workers and other under-protected self-employed workers would be exempt from EU competition law, as are those of employees. At the same time, however, this paper recognizes that, in the absence of such an interpretative turn, antitrust legislators and policy makers could aid gig workers and other under-protected self-employed workers by excluding them and their collective agreements from the scope of application of competition law. This—and here is the third thesis of the article—would not force the interpretation of antitrust notions and rules and would thus not require antitrust authorities and courts to use competition law to pursue goals different from the protection of efficiency and innovation. KEYWORDS: Employees, gig workers, social rights, exemptions, collective agreements JEL CLASSIFICATION: K21

中文翻译：

---

即使员工也是劳动力市场的企业，但授予社会权利不是反垄断的工作

关于零工工人集体谈判权的激烈辩论源于这样一种观点，即欧盟 (EU) 竞争法对待这群工人的态度比对待员工的糟糕。也就是说，人们普遍认为，与零工不同，员工被允许签订集体协议，因为他们不是企业，因此不受欧盟竞争法的约束。与此形成鲜明对比的是，通过分析欧盟的承诺概念，本文证明了——这是其论文的第一篇——在劳动力市场中，这个市场应该与集体协议的影响有关，雇员是与任何其他工人（例如零工或其他个体经营者）一样从事许多工作。文章进一步认为，目前允许员工集体谈判的原因，而其他工人则不是，不是在竞争法范围内，而是在竞争法之外。目前，雇员集体协议免于适用欧盟竞争法，因为雇员享有集体谈判权等社会权利，而且欧盟法院已经（正确地）承认对这些权利的保护权利必须胜过保护竞争。因此，本文认为，作为其第二个论点，如果将 TFEU 第 151-161 条解释为赋予雇员以外的工人社会权利，则零工工人和其他受保护不足的自雇工人的集体协议将被豁免来自欧盟竞争法，员工也是如此。然而，与此同时，本文承认，在没有这种解释性转向的情况下，反垄断立法者和政策制定者可以通过将零工工人和其他受保护不足的个体经营者排除在竞争法的适用范围之外来帮助他们和他们的集体协议。这——也是本文的第三个论点——不会强制解释反垄断概念和规则，因此不会要求反垄断当局和法院使用竞争法来追求与保护效率和创新不同的目标。关键词：员工、零工、社会权利、豁免、集体协议 JEL 分类：K21 这——也是本文的第三个论点——不会强制解释反垄断概念和规则，因此不会要求反垄断当局和法院使用竞争法来追求与保护效率和创新不同的目标。关键词：员工、零工、社会权利、豁免、集体协议 JEL 分类：K21 这——也是本文的第三个论点——不会强制解释反垄断概念和规则，因此不会要求反垄断当局和法院使用竞争法来追求与保护效率和创新不同的目标。关键词：员工、零工、社会权利、豁免、集体协议 JEL 分类：K21