We examine whether directors on a board who are related to minority shareholders have an effect on bank risk. We use a panel of European banks with a controlling shareholder over the period from 2003 to 2017 and find that these directors result in lower risk. Our results depend crucially on whether or not such directors have reputational concerns or financial expertise, and the level of shareholder protection; the observed decrease in risk does not depend on their position on the board or on the presence of controlling shareholders. To identify the relationship, we use a dynamic generalized method of moments.

中文翻译：

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董事与少数股东相关时对银行风险的影响

我们研究了与少数股东相关的董事会董事是否对银行风险有影响。我们使用了 2003 年至 2017 年期间拥有控股股东的欧洲银行小组，发现这些董事的风险较低。我们的结果主要取决于这些董事是否有声誉问题或财务专业知识，以及股东保护的水平；观察到的风险降低并不取决于他们在董事会的地位或控股股东的存在。为了识别这种关系，我们使用动态广义矩方法。