Legal sanctions cause reputational losses in addition to the direct losses. Lowering the probability of punishment reduces these reputational losses by diluting the informational value of verdicts. These considerations better align the positive as well as normative implications of law enforcement models with intuition and empirics: violations of the law are more responsive to the certainty rather than the severity of punishment even absent risk-seeking offenders (positive), which causes extreme Beckerian punishments to be inefficient when sanctions are socially costly to impose (normative). Moreover, in some cases optimal enforcement is “anti-Beckerian”: punishment is symbolic, and detection costs are incurred solely to provide reputational incentives.

中文翻译：

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声誉与贝克尔制裁

除直接损失外，法律制裁还造成名誉损失。降低惩罚的概率通过稀释判决的信息价值来减少这些声誉损失。这些考虑更好地将执法模式的积极和规范含义与直觉和经验相结合：即使没有寻求风险的罪犯（积极），违法行为对确定性而不是惩罚的严厉程度更敏感，这会导致极端的贝克尔式当制裁的社会成本很高时，惩罚是低效的（规范性的）。此外，在某些情况下，最佳执行是“反贝克尔式的”：惩罚是象征性的，检测成本仅仅是为了提供声誉激励。