This article analyzes pretrial bargaining between litigants with reference-dependent preferences. We build on Bebchuk (1984, “Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information,” 15 Rand Journal of Economics 404–15) and, motivated by empirical evidence, assume that the referent is based on expectations. We find that reference dependence on behalf of plaintiffs increases the settlement probability. The fact that preferences are reference-dependent meaningfully influences comparative statics predictions. In our extensions, we discuss the role of fee shifting, the effect of having the referent based on the status quo instead of on expectations, and risk aversion.

中文翻译：

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具有参考依赖偏好的和解谈判

本文分析了具有参考依赖偏好的诉讼当事人之间的审前讨价还价。我们以 Bebchuk (1984, “Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information,” 15 Rand Journal of Economics 404-15) 为基础，并在经验证据的推动下假设所指对象是基于预期的。我们发现代表原告的参考依赖增加了和解的可能性。偏好依赖于参考的事实对比较静态预测产生了有意义的影响。在我们的扩展中，我们讨论了费用转移的作用，基于现状而不是期望的参照物的影响，以及风险规避。