In this article, I argue for a realist anthropology based on the recognition of mind-independent reality; pitching this premise against concerted anti-dualist tendencies in contemporary anthropological thinking. I spell out core analytical entailments of these, in my view, profoundly conflicting premises. In particular, I focus on perspectival multi-naturalism, arguing that despite adherents’ claims to reinvigorate studies of ‘ontology’, this approach instead exaggerates epistemological dimensions. When assessed from a realist stance, its ground position engenders a series of epistemic fallacies by which the ontological is, effectively, subordinated under epistemology. Advocates’ reluctance to appreciate a distinction between mind and mind-independent reality entails a profound contraction of perspective in terms of empirical and methodological scope, and, analytically, a disregard for ontological complexity and depth, thus curtailing the importance of anthropology in wider academic discourse.

在本文中，我主张一种基于对独立于心灵的现实的认识的现实主义人类学；将这一前提与当代人类学思想中一致的反二元论倾向相提并论。在我看来，我阐述了这些非常矛盾的前提的核心分析内涵。特别是，我关注视角多元自然主义，认为尽管拥护者声称要重振“本体论”研究，但这种方法反而夸大了认识论维度。当从现实主义立场评估时，它的基础位置会产生一系列认识论谬误，通过这些谬误，本体论实际上是从属于认识论的。