Studies of electoral clientelism—the contingent exchange of material benefits for electoral support—frequently presume the presence of strong parties. Parties facilitate monitoring and enforcement of vote buying and allow brokers to identify core voters for turnout buying. Where money fuels campaigns but elections center around candidates, not parties, how do candidates pitch electoral handouts? The authors analyze candidates’ distribution of cash during an Indonesian election. Drawing upon varied data, including surveys of voters and brokers, candidates’ cash-distribution lists, and focus-group discussions, they find heavy spending but little evidence of vote buying or turnout buying. Instead, candidates buy brokers. With little loyalty or party brand to draw on, candidates seek to establish credibility with well-networked brokers, who then protect their turf with token payments for their own presumed bloc of voters. The authors find little evidence of monitoring of either voter or broker behavior, which is consistent with their argument that these payments are noncontingent.

对选举支持主义的研究——以物质利益为条件交换选举支持——经常假设存在强大的政党。各方促进对投票购买的监控和执行，并允许经纪人识别核心选民以进行投票购买。在金钱推动竞选活动但选举以候选人而非政党为中心的地方，候选人如何宣传选举讲义？作者分析了印度尼西亚选举期间候选人的现金分配情况。利用各种数据，包括对选民和经纪人的调查、候选人的现金分配清单和焦点小组讨论，他们发现支出很大，但几乎没有证据表明购买选票或投票率。相反，候选人购买经纪人。由于几乎没有忠诚度或党派品牌可利用，候选人寻求与网络良好的经纪人建立信誉，然后，他们用象征性的付款为他们自己假定的选民集团保护自己的地盘。作者几乎没有发现监控选民或经纪人行为的证据，这与他们的论点一致，即这些付款是非或有的。