Empirical evidence suggests that charitable contributions to public goods by businesses may be driven not only by the familiar warm glow of giving motive but also as a means for businesses to signal high product quality. Building on this finding, we present an analytical framework that demonstrates that the optimal degree of subsidization should decrease with the extent to which the signal is informative and may even turn into a tax when the signal is sufficiently strong.

中文翻译：

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企业慈善捐款的信号作用：税收政策视角

经验证据表明，企业对公共产品的慈善捐款可能不仅受到人们熟悉的捐赠动机的温暖光芒的推动，而且还被认为是企业表明高产品质量的一种手段。基于这一发现，我们提出了一个分析框架，该框架表明，最佳补贴程度应该随着信号信息量的增加而降低，并且当信号足够强时甚至可能变成税收。