While accounting research has extensively examined initial guidance disclosures, the disclosures managers make when initial forecasts become materially inaccurate have received much less attention. These updates are unique because managers are communicating that their initial forecasts are no longer correct. In this context, we examine how earnings forecast withdrawals affect managers’ reporting reputation, relative to earnings revisions and nondisclosure. While managers face immediate negative market consequences after withdrawals, they enjoy reputational benefits (in the form of improved credibility) in the long run when guidance updates resume. In contrast, reporting reputation does not improve for managers who revise forecasts or for those who choose not to update at all. Difference-in-differences analyses confirm this incremental boost to credibility associated with withdrawals. This evidence suggests disclosing what managers do not know may be as important as disclosing what they do know when building a reporting reputation.

中文翻译：

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预测取款和报告声誉

虽然会计研究已经广泛检查了初始指导性披露，但当初始预测变得严重不准确时，管理人员所做的披露受到的关注要少得多。这些更新是独一无二的，因为经理们正在传达他们的初始预测不再正确。在这种情况下，我们研究了盈利预测的撤销如何影响经理的报告声誉，相对于盈利修正和保密。虽然经理们在退出后面临直接的负面市场后果，但从长远来看，当指导更新恢复时，他们会享有声誉利益（以提高可信度的形式）。相比之下，对于修改预测或选择完全不更新的经理来说，报告声誉并没有提高。差异中的差异分析证实了这种与提款相关的可信度的增量提升。这一证据表明，在建立报告声誉时，披露经理们不知道的事情可能与披露他们所知道的事情一样重要。