We present a public procurement model in which contractual flexibility and political tolerance for contractual deviations determine renegotiations. In the model, contractual flexibility allows for adaptation without formal renegotiation, while political tolerance for deviations decreases with political competition. We then compare renegotiation rates of procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find robust evidence consistent with the model predictions: public-to-private contracts are renegotiated more often than comparable private-to-private contracts, and that this pattern is more salient in politically contestable jurisdictions. The frequent renegotiation of public contracts results from their inherent rigidity and provides a relational quality of adaptability to contingencies in politically contestable environments. (JEL D23, D72, D73, D78, H57).

中文翻译：

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循规蹈矩：政治竞争性和公共合同重新谈判

我们提出了一个公共采购模型，其中合同灵活性和对合同偏差的政治容忍度决定了重新谈判。在该模型中，合同灵活性允许在没有正式重新谈判的情况下进行调整，而对偏差的政治容忍度会随着政治竞争而降低。然后，我们比较了采购人是公共行政机构或私营公司的采购合同的重新谈判率。我们发现与模型预测一致的有力证据：与类似的私人对私人合同相比，公共对私人合同的重新谈判频率更高，并且这种模式在政治上存在争议的司法管辖区更为突出。公共合同的频繁重新谈判源于其固有的僵化性，并提供了对政治竞争环境中突发事件的适应性的关系质量。(JEL D23、D72、D73、D78、H57)。