When Congress writes and passes statutes, it can include detailed provisions designating how judicial review of agency actions will operate. Yet despite their importance, empirical research has suffered from a lack of a systematic measure or assessment of these review provisions. In this project, we create a new measure of exposure to judicial review by hand-coding judicial review provisions in the text of significant legislation from 1947 to 2016. We identify five categories of review provisions, including language that describes the reviewability of agency decisions, time limits for petitioning courts, the scope of review, court venue, and standing. Utilizing these attributes, we construct latent indexes of exposure to the judiciary, including law-specific and agency-specific versions of these indexes. We then examine the validity of these measures of agency exposure to judicial review by assessing their covariation with litigation, discretion, and independence. Our data create possibilities for future research on how Congress can strategically attempt to influence other branches as well as insight into interactions among the branches in a separation-of-powers system.

中文翻译：

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衡量代理行为司法审查的立法设计

当国会编写和通过法规时，它可以包括详细的规定，指定如何对机构行动进行司法审查。然而，尽管它们很重要，但实证研究却因缺乏对这些审查规定的系统衡量或评估而受到影响。在这个项目中，我们通过在 1947 年至 2016 年的重要立法文本中手工编码司法审查条款来创建一种新的司法审查暴露衡量标准。我们确定了五类审查条款，包括描述机构决定的可审查性的语言，诉请法院的时限、审查范围、开庭地点和资格。利用这些属性，我们构建了暴露于司法机构的潜在指数，包括这些指数的法律特定和机构特定版本。然后，我们通过评估它们与诉讼、自由裁量权和独立性的协变来检验这些机构暴露于司法审查的措施的有效性。我们的数据为未来研究国会如何战略性地尝试影响其他分支机构以及深入了解权力分立系统中分支机构之间的相互作用创造了可能性。