This article studies the incentive to settle confidentially, openly, or to go to trial given that the existence of a confidential settlement might become publicly known. Depending on whether the defendant (D) or the plaintiff cares more about the Public’s inference from the litigation outcome, a confidential settlement may signal a more-culpable or less-culpable D. The informational disadvantage of confidentiality is weighed against the benefit of privacy, as well as the litigants’ relative desire for more visibility or less visibility. (JEL K41, K13).

中文翻译：

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潜在已知的机密和解

鉴于保密和解的存在可能会为公众所知，本文研究了秘密、公开和解或进行审判的动机。根据被告 (D) 或原告是否更关心公众从诉讼结果中的推论，保密和解可能表明 D 的责任更大或更少。保密的信息劣势与隐私的利益相权衡，以及诉讼当事人对更多可见度或更少可见度的相对渴望。(JEL K41, K13)。