Transparency of the lobbying process is hailed as an effective means to limit the influence of special interest groups, but should transparency also apply to the information obtained by policy makers (PMs)? This article extends theories of informational lobbying by explicitly modeling the choice of PMs to obtain information before interacting with lobbyists. This approach reveals a new channel for the value of confidentiality: extracting evidence from special interest groups. It shows that, counter-intuitively, the influence of special interest groups can increase as PMs become more expert. These results shed light on the relationship between confidentiality, good governance, and influence.

中文翻译：

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机密政策信息的价值：说服力、透明度和影响力

游说过程的透明度被誉为限制特殊利益集团影响的有效手段，但透明度是否也适用于政策制定者（PM）获得的信息？本文通过明确建模 PM 的选择以在与说客互动之前获取信息来扩展信息游说理论。这种方法揭示了保密价值的新渠道：从特殊利益集团中提取证据。它表明，与直觉相反，随着 PM 变得更加专业，特殊利益集团的影响力会增加。这些结果揭示了保密性、良好治理和影响力之间的关系。