当前位置: X-MOL 学术The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Deterrence of Orchestrated Cheating: Group versus Individual Punishment
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization ( IF 1.324 ) Pub Date : 2021-12-28 , DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewab042
Shmuel Leshem 1 , Abraham L Wickelgren 2
Affiliation  

In the wake of a state-sponsored doping scandal, the World Anti-Doping Agency recommended banning all Russian athletes from the Rio Olympic Games. We study the circumstances in which such group penalties deter a group leader, whose payoff is tied to the group’s benefits and sanctions, from helping cheating group members avoid detection. We show that relative to individual punishment, group punishment deters orchestrated cheating and thereby increases individual deterrence for sufficiently strong enforcement and an intermediate detection-avoidance technology. Otherwise, group punishment fosters more individual cheating. Group punishment is thus a double-edged sword useful primarily as an off-equilibrium threat against orchestrated cheating but detrimental if frequently imposed on the equilibrium path. (JEL C72, K42)

中文翻译:

策划作弊的威慑:集体惩罚与个人惩罚

在国家赞助的兴奋剂丑闻之后,世界反兴奋剂机构建议禁止所有俄罗斯运动员参加里约奥运会。我们研究了这种团体惩罚阻止团体领导帮助作弊团体成员避免被发现的情况,他们的回报与团体的利益和制裁有关。我们表明,相对于个人惩罚,群体惩罚阻止了精心策划的作弊,从而增加了个人对足够强有力的执法和中间检测避免技术的威慑力。否则,集体惩罚会助长更多的个人作弊。因此,集体惩罚是一把双刃剑,主要用作针对精心策划的作弊的非均衡威胁,但如果经常施加在均衡路径上,则有害。(JEL C72, K42)
更新日期:2021-12-28
down
wechat
bug