I propose a new mechanism for sluggish wages based on workers’ noisy information about the state of the economy. Wages do not respond immediately to a positive aggregate shock because workers do not (yet) have enough information to demand higher wages. The model is robust to two major criticisms of existing theories of sluggish wages and volatile unemployment, namely, that wages are flexible for new hires and the flow opportunity cost of employment (FOCE) is pro-cyclicality. The model generates volatility in the labor market as well as wage and FOCE elasticities with respect to productivity, consistent with the data. (JEL E24, E32, J24, J31, J63)

中文翻译：

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信息摩擦下失业与工资的周期性行为

我根据工人对经济状况的嘈杂信息提出了一种新的工资低迷机制。工资不会立即对积极的总体冲击做出反应，因为工人（还）没有足够的信息来要求更高的工资。该模型对现有的工资低迷和失业率波动理论的两个主要批评是稳健的，即工资对于新员工来说是灵活的，流动机会成本（FOCE）是顺周期性的。该模型产生了劳动力市场的波动性以及工资和 FOCE 相对于生产力的弹性，与数据一致。(JEL E24、E32、J24、J31、J63)