We address the growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may lessen competition, using the introduction of national leniency programs (LPs) as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements. Based on data from 63 countries, we find a large and significant immediate increase in domestic horizontal MS acquisitions once an LP is introduced but only in countries where the LP is deemed to be effective. There is no effect on non-horizontal or cross-border MS acquisitions. Our findings suggest that firms may use MS acquisitions to either stabilize collusive agreements or soften competition in the event that collusion breaks down. (JEL G34, K21, L12, L41)

中文翻译：

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少数股权收购的反竞争效应：来自引入国家宽大政策的证据

我们通过引入国家宽大处理计划（LPs）作为破坏串通协议稳定的冲击，解决了竞争对手公司的少数股权（MS）可能会减少竞争的日益增长的担忧。根据来自 63 个国家/地区的数据，我们发现，一旦引入 LP，国内横向 MS 收购立即显着增加，但仅限于 LP 被认为有效的国家。对非水平或跨境 MS 收购没有影响。我们的研究结果表明，公司可能会使用 MS 收购来稳定共谋协议或在共谋破裂的情况下缓和竞争。(JEL G34, K21, L12, L41)