We study efficient exclusion policies in a canonical credit model that features both exogenous and strategic default along the equilibrium path. Policies that maximize welfare in a stationary equilibrium implement exclusion for a finite and deterministic number of periods following default. Front-loading exclusion makes the mass of socially valuable transactions as high as it can be in steady state. Less intuitively, doing so also maximizes the average welfare of excluded agents in equilibrium conditional on the level of incentives provided by the threat of exclusion. We argue that these results are robust to a host of natural variations on our benchmark model. (JEL C73, D53, D86, G21, G32, G51)

中文翻译：

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最佳金融排斥

我们研究了规范信用模型中的有效排除政策，该模型沿均衡路径具有外生和战略违约。在固定均衡中最大化福利的政策在违约后的有限和确定的时期内实施排除。前置式排除使得具有社会价值的交易数量尽可能多地处于稳定状态。不太直观的是，这样做也最大化了被排斥代理人在均衡中的平均福利，条件是排斥威胁提供的激励水平。我们认为这些结果对我们的基准模型的许多自然变化是稳健的。(JEL C73, D53, D86, G21, G32, G51)