Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others’ cooperativeness, suggesting that both factors are drivers of observed spillover effects. In additional treatments, we provide evidence for several factors, including characteristics of institutions, that enhance or limit the effectiveness and scope of spillover effects. (JEL C92, D02, D83, D91, H41)

中文翻译：

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制度对合作行为、偏好和信念的溢出效应

大多数机构的范围有限。我们通过实验研究执法机构如何影响行为、偏好和信念，而不是直接影响他们控制的行为。团体玩两个相同的公益游戏，在一个游戏中强制执行合作。制度通常对不受监管的博弈具有经济上显着的正溢出效应。我们还观察到，机构增强了有条件的合作偏好和对他人合作的信念，这表明这两个因素都是观察到的溢出效应的驱动因素。在其他处理中，我们提供了几个因素的证据，包括机构的特征，这些因素增强或限制了溢出效应的有效性和范围。(JEL C92, D02, D83, D91, H41)