A principal owns a firm, hires an agent of uncertain productivity, and designs a dynamic policy for evaluating his performance. The agent observes ongoing evaluations and decides when to quit. When not quitting, the agent is paid a wage that is linear in his expected productivity; the principal claims the residual performance. After quitting, the players secure fixed outside options. I show that equilibrium is Pareto efficient. For a broad class of performance technologies, the equilibrium wage deterministically grows with tenure. My analysis suggests that endogenous performance evaluation plays an important role in shaping careers in organizations. (JEL D21, D82, D83, J24, J31, J41, M51)

中文翻译：

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动态评估设计

委托人拥有一家公司，雇佣一个生产率不确定的代理人，并设计一个动态的政策来评估他的业绩。代理观察正在进行的评估并决定何时退出。不辞职时，代理人的工资与他的预期生产率成线性关系；委托人要求剩余业绩。退出后，玩家获得固定的外部选项。我证明均衡是帕累托有效的。对于一大类绩效技术，均衡工资随着任期确定性地增长。我的分析表明，内生绩效评估在塑造组织职业生涯中起着重要作用。(JEL D21、D82、D83、J24、J31、J41、M51)