In two-sided markets, two groups of agents interact through platforms. Because agents’ decision to join a platform is affected by the presence of agents on the other side, their interactions create indirect network externalities and make platforms’ strategies different from those of firms in one-sided markets. In this paper, I use a structural model to show that platforms may take a loss on one side of the market to make a profit on the other side and that platform mergers may benefit some agents by lowering prices or attracting more agents on the other side of the market. (JEL D62, G34, L82, M37)

中文翻译：

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应用于杂志广告的双边市场平台市场力量估算

在双边市场中，两组代理人通过平台进行互动。由于代理人加入平台的决定受到另一方代理人的影响，他们的互动产生了间接的网络外部性，并使平台的战略不同于单边市场中的公司。在本文中，我使用一个结构模型来表明平台可能会在市场的一侧承担亏损以在另一侧获利，并且平台合并可能会通过降低价格或吸引另一侧的更多代理商来使某些代理商受益的市场。(JEL D62, G34, L82, M37)