We develop a model wherein concerns about prosecutor quality reduce the willingness of witnesses to cooperate with prosecutors. This causes an increase in the crime rate and in wrongly convicted innocent defendants. Because citizens are taxpayers and may be victims, perpetrators, witnesses, or falsely accused defendants, they care about the prosecutor’s quality. They update beliefs about this quality based on the disposition of cases. If the prosecutor’s believed quality falls below a threshold, then a majority of voters chooses to replace the prosecutor with a challenger, in expectation of reform. We compare the majority’s choice with that of a social planner. (JEL D83, K41, K42)

中文翻译：

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检察官质量、证人参与、犯罪和改革

我们开发了一个模型，其中对检察官质量的担忧降低了证人与检察官合作的意愿。这导致犯罪率和被错误定罪的无辜被告增加。因为公民是纳税人，可能是受害者、肇事者、证人或被诬告的被告，他们关心检察官的素质。他们根据案件的处理情况更新对这种质量的看法。如果检察官认为的质量低于某个阈值，那么大多数选民会选择用挑战者取代检察官，以期进行改革。我们将多数人的选择与社会规划者的选择进行比较。(JEL D83, K41, K42)