We analyze the incentives for showing off, which we model as a costly signaling game, and study the consequences of norms against such behavior. Prior to competing in a contest, a newcomer can signal his talent to an incumbent. In equilibrium, costly signaling of ability occurs only when the newcomer is exceptionally talented. In such situations signaling benefits both contestants: the newcomer for obvious reasons; the incumbent by economizing on wasted effort in the contest. Our results rationalize the emergence of norms against showing off in settings where total effort is important. When selection efficiency matters, such norms decrease welfare. (JEL D82, D83, D91, Z13)

中文翻译：

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炫耀还是低调？精神病患者的经济学

我们分析了炫耀的动机，我们将其建模为代价高昂的信号游戏，并研究规范对此类行为的影响。在参加比赛之前，新人可以向现任者表明他的才能。在均衡状态下，只有当新来者非常有才华时，才会出现代价高昂的能力信号。在这种情况下，信号对两个参赛者都有好处：出于明显原因的新人；现任者通过在比赛中节省浪费的精力。我们的结果合理化了规范的出现，反对在全努力很重要的环境中炫耀。When selection efficiency matters, such norms decrease welfare. (JEL D82, D83, D91, Z13)