Information regulation that penalizes deceptive communication by firms can have significant unintended consequences. We consider a market where competing firms communicate private information about product quality through a combination of pricing and direct communication (advertising or labeling) that may be false. A higher fine for lying reduces the reliance on price signaling, thereby lowering market power and consumption distortions; however, it may lead to excessive disclosure. Low fines are always worse than no fines. High fines are welfare improving only if communication itself is inexpensive. Penalizing false claims may reduce profits of both high- and low-quality firms. (JEL D21, D83, L25, M37)

中文翻译：

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规范产品沟通

惩罚公司欺骗性沟通的信息监管可能会产生重大的意想不到的后果。我们考虑一个市场，竞争公司通过定价和直接沟通（广告或标签）的组合来传达有关产品质量的私人信息，这些信息可能是错误的。更高的撒谎罚款减少了对价格信号的依赖，从而降低了市场力量和消费扭曲；但是，这可能会导致过度披露。低罚款总是比没有罚款更糟糕。高额罚款只有在沟通成本低廉的情况下才能改善福利。惩罚虚假声明可能会降低高质量和低质量公司的利润。(JEL D21, D83, L25, M37)