We study trust building in credence-goods markets in a dynamic setting. When consumers’ expected loss is low and it is efficient to fix only the more severe problem, there is no trade in the one-shot game. In the repeated game, an expert’s honesty is monitored through consumers’ rejection of his recommendations. The expert’s profit in the optimal equilibrium weakly increases in the discount factor but does not achieve the first best, which contrasts sharply with the optimal equilibrium in experience-goods markets. The optimal equilibrium involves undertreatment if the expert is sufficiently patient, and overtreatment if he is moderately patient. (JEL C73, D82, D83, Z13)

中文翻译：

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在信用商品市场建立信任

我们在动态环境中研究信用商品市场的信任建设。当消费者的预期损失很低并且只解决更严重的问题是有效的时，一次性博弈就没有交易。在重复博弈中，通过消费者拒绝他的建议来监控专家的诚实度。最优均衡中专家的利润在贴现因子中微弱增加，但没有达到第一最佳，这与体验商品市场中的最优均衡形成鲜明对比。如果专家有足够的耐心，则最佳平衡包括治疗不足，如果他有适度的耐心，则治疗过度。(JEL C73, D82, D83, Z13)