In a model where agents differ in wages and preferences over labor time–consumption bundles, we study labor income tax schemes that alleviate poverty. To avoid conflict with individual well-being, we require redistribution to take place between agents on both sides of the poverty line provided they have the same labor time. This requirement is combined with efficiency and robustness properties. Maximizing the resulting social preferences under incentive compatibility constraints yields the following evaluation criterion: tax schemes should minimize the labor time required to reach the poverty line. We apply this criterion to European countries and the United States. (JEL H23, H24, I31, I32, J22)

中文翻译：

---

福利、贫困和劳动所得税：理论和在欧洲和美国的应用

在一个代理人的工资和偏好不同的模型中，我们研究了减轻贫困的劳动所得税计划。为了避免与个人福利发生冲突，我们要求在贫困线两侧的代理人之间进行再分配，前提是他们有相同的劳动时间。这一要求与效率和稳健性相结合。在激励相容性约束下最大化由此产生的社会偏好会产生以下评估标准：税收计划应尽量减少达到贫困线所需的劳动时间。我们将此标准应用于欧洲国家和美国。(JEL H23, H24, I31, I32, J22)