We compare a credit rating agency’s incentives to acquire costly information when it is only paid for giving favorable ratings to the corresponding incentives when the agency is paid up-front, i.e., irrespective of the ratings assigned. We show that, in the presence of moral hazard, contingent fees provide stronger dynamic incentives to acquire information than up-front fees and may induce higher social welfare. When the fee structure is chosen by the agency, contingent fees arise as an equilibrium outcome, in line with the way the market for credit rating actually works. (JEL D21, D82, D83, G24)

中文翻译：

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信用评级行业的费用、声誉和信息生产

我们比较了信用评级机构获取高成本信息的动机，当它只为给予有利的评级而获得报酬时，当该机构预先支付相应的奖励时，即，与分配的评级无关。我们表明，在存在道德风险的情况下，与预付费用相比，或有费用为获取信息提供了更强的动态激励，并可能带来更高的社会福利。当机构选择费用结构时，或有费用作为一种均衡结果出现，与信用评级市场的实际运作方式一致。(JEL D21、D82、D83、G24)