This paper studies how security design affects project outcomes. Consider a firm that raises capital for multiple projects by offering investors a share of the revenues. The revenue of each project is determined ex post through bargaining with a buyer of the output. Thus, the choice of security affects the feasible payoffs of the bargaining game. We characterize the securities that achieve the firm’s maximal equilibrium payoff in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In a large class of securities, the optimal contract is remarkably simple. The firm finances each project separately with defaultable debt. Welfare and empirical implications are discussed. (JEL C78, D21, D86, G12, G32)

中文翻译：

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基于谈判的安全设计模型

本文研究安全设计如何影响项目成果。考虑一家通过向投资者提供收入分成来为多个项目筹集资金的公司。每个项目的收入是事后通过与产出的买方讨价还价确定的。因此，证券的选择会影响讨价还价博弈的可行收益。我们描述了在双边和多边谈判中实现公司最大均衡收益的证券。在一大类证券中，最优合约非常简单。该公司以可违约债务分别为每个项目提供资金。福利和实证意义进行了讨论。(JEL C78, D21, D86, G12, G32)